Introduction of policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will impose costs, but emissions trading should help reduce the overall cost of compliance, especially compared to a direct regulatory approach. Emissions trading will enable companies (at the domestic level) and countries (at the international level) with high marginal costs to purchase reductions from companies and countries with lower marginal abatement costs. Even with emissions trading, however, costs will be incurred and impacts felt. Impacts will include a change in the generation mix and the price of electricity, but the extent of the impact is dependent on many other factors, including the composition of a country's power generators, the primary fuel used, the cost of the primary fuel used, and domestic energy policies. The extent to which these impacts can be predicted, or felt during the trading periods, depends in part on the uncertainties surrounding the process of implementing an emissions trading scheme.
Although many OECD countries have committed to implementing emissions trading schemes even without the Kyoto Protocol, uncertainty exists in many areas of the current process. These uncertainties present potential barriers to the development of a fully functional and liquid market, in that the uncertainties could influence the development of the market itself and how players perceive the risks of climate change policy.
Politically, continued uncertainty surrounds the Kyoto Protocol. Russia continues to be one of the great 'unknowns' in climate policy and in market development. Entry into force of the Protocol is dependent on Russia. The longer it takes for Russia to ratify, the greater the uncertainty for the Protocol process and the more delay there will be in establishing the governance bodies that are to determine whether countries are eligible to trade under the Kyoto trading system. Even if Russia ratifies some time before 2007, it remains to be seen whether or when they will be able to meet requirements for participating in emissions trading or even joint implementation. In 2005, the UN climate process may begin assessing the progress Annex I countries have made towards fulfilling commitments under the Protocol. This assessment is likely to influence discussions over a second commitment period, in which many Annex I Parties have stated that participation at a more global level is required, that is, that the US must come on board and at least some of the larger developing countries will need to take on some type of commitment.
Under the Protocol framework, emissions trading is only one of the possible measures countries can implement to meet their targets. While domestic trading schemes are aimed at the company level, trading under the Protocol requires that countries remain responsible for their commitments. Governments can devolve their 'cap' and authorize companies to trade. They can also retain all or part of their 'cap' and trade at the government level. Current designs for domestic emissions trading schemes do not call for allocation of the entire Kyoto cap. This implies that under the Protocol, governments are likely trade any allowances that are not distributed to trading sectors.
Countries that have developed emissions trading schemes will need to detail what level of commitment they intent to keep in the event the Protocol does not enter into force. With the exception of the Norwegian proposal for 2008 to 2012, very few trading schemes intend to allocate their entire Kyoto 'cap' into the trading schemes. The EU scheme during the first trading period (2005) (2006) (2007) covers approximately 40 per cent of its overall target, whereas if the Norwegian proposal were put into place, it would cover almost 90 per cent. If countries are to abide by their Protocol targets, they will have to work out details on how they intend to meet targets, how stringent the cap will be for the 2008 to 2012 period and for follow-on periods.
THE ALLOCATION PROCESS
Perhaps one of the most difficult issues governments face in designing and implementing an emissions trading scheme is how to allocate the cap on emissions. Allocation plans determine the amount of emissions each participating company must reduce, and the total cost of the reductions. Different methods imply different costs, and can create different 'winners and losers' depending on the allocation formula. This makes allocation plans a politically charged issue.
In deciding on an allocation plan, governments examine a number of issues. The first is determining whether to distribute allowances free of charge or to auction them, or some combination of the two. Under current trading schemes, countries are primarily distributing allowances free of charge since this is politically more acceptable than requiring source to
